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Abstract
We provide a complete and sound
axiomatization of the set-theoretic
model of Galanis [2007]. By con-
structing a syntax with several knowl-
edge modalities, one for each sub-
language, we are able to allow for
agents to make mistakes about the
knowledge of others without discard-
ing the truth axiom. Comparing the
present axiom system with that of
Heifetz et al. [2008a] we find that nei-
ther is a generalization of the other.
JEL-Classifications: C70, C72,
D80, D82.
Keywords: unawareness, uncer-
tainty, knowledge, interactive episte-
mology, modal logic, bounded per-
ception.
1 Introduction
We provide a complete and sound axiomati-
zation of the set-theoretic model of Galanis
[2007]. The approach we use follows that of
Heifetz et al. [2008a] (HMS from now on), of
constructing a canonical unawareness structure.
The purpose of the axiomatization is to pro-
vide syntactic foundations for the set-theoretic
model and to compare this approach with the
other papers in the literature.
In order to illustrate the difference between
the present and other approaches, we need
to distinguish between a language and a sub-
language. When modeling knowledge using
a syntactic approach, the modeler starts with
a set of primitive propositions, consisting of
statements like “it rains” or “the price is high”.
Using negation (¬), conjunction (∧) and the
knowledge modality ki, a language is created,
containing all the well formed formulas. More-
over, it is implicitly assumed that all agents
have a perfect understanding of that language.
For example, the formula “agent i knows that it
rains” is equally understood by everyone. How-
ever, if we introduce unawareness, this may not
be true.
Modica and Rustichini [1999] and HMS spec-
ify that apart from the universal language that
is generated from all primitive propositions,
there are also several sub-languages, each gen-
erated by some of the primitive propositions.
An agent who is aware only of some primitive
propositions describes the world using one sub-
language, which may be very different from the
sub-language used by another agent. Moreover,
the agents may not comprehend or be unaware
of other sub-languages.
Suppose there are two agents, each using a dif-
ferent sub-language, both containing the state-
ment “the price is high”. It is clear that both
agents understand “prices” in the same way.
However, does this imply that the statement
“agent i knows that the price is high” is also
understood in the same way by both agents? In
other words, is knowledge when described in
one sub-language identical to knowledge when
described in another sub-language? In HMS
and other papers in the literature the answer is
“yes”, so there is only one, objective, knowl-
edge modality. In Galanis [2007] and in this
paper we allow for the knowledge modality to
be different across sub-languages. This cap-
tures the idea that agents of different percep-
tion (awareness) may reason differently about
the knowledge of others.
A short example illustrates the point.1 Suppose
that agent j is only aware of the statement “the
price is high” and that the price will be deter-
mined tomorrow. In other words, it is sim-
ply not possible for anyone to know whether
prices are high or low, if he is only aware
of prices. Hence, agent j concludes that, in
his sub-language, i does not know whether the
price is high. But suppose that agent i is also
aware of the statement “the interest rate is low”
and that there is a logical connection specify-
ing that a low interest rate implies a high price.
Agent i concludes that, in his sub-language, he
knows that the price is high. Although agent j
is wrong when reasoning about i’s knowledge,
this is only because he is constrained by his un-
awareness. Because it is correct that no one can
know whether the price is high if he is unaware
of the interest rate, j is not making a mistake
within the bounds of his awareness.
One way of modeling this example, within the
standard setting of a unique knowledge modal-
ity, is to drop the truth axiom, (kjφ → φ),
which says that if j knows something then it
is true. However, in this way we allow agents
to be totally irrational and to make all kinds of
mistakes, even unrelated to unawareness.
In order to avoid this extra irrationality we in-
troduce one knowledge modality, kiα, for each
sub-language which is generated by a set α of
primitive propositions. Moreover, we impose
1In Galanis [2007] we provide more examples and argu-
ments.
the truth axiom for each knowledge modality
(kiαφ → φ) and we add an axiom saying that
more complete sub-languages give a better de-
scription of knowledge. Formally, if α ⊆ α′
then kiαφ→ kiα′φ. Therefore, agent j can make
a mistake about i’s knowledge only if his sub-
language is not more complete than i’s sub-
language. For example, we can simultaneously
have ¬kiαφ and kiα′φ only if α′ is not a subset of
α.2 Moreover, since the truth axiom holds for
every sub-language, this is the only mistake in
reasoning that any agent is allowed to make.
For instance, suppose j knows φ, so that kjαφ
is true. If φ is the statement “it rains” then
it is true that it rains. But if φ is the state-
ment ¬kiαφ′, then although ¬kiαφ′ is also true,
it may be that because agent i’s sub-language is
α′ (and α ⊂ α′) we also have kiα′φ′, so that j is
(essentially) making a mistake.
Summarizing, although one could argue that an
“awareness leads to knowledge” effect is better
captured in a dynamic environment, it has sig-
nificant implications in a static model as well.
As was described above, if two agents differ
only in that one is more aware than the other,
then the more aware agent would have more
knowledge. Moreover, the less aware agent
would mistakenly think that their knowledge is
the same. This can be captured by relaxing the
truth axiom in the standard model but then all
possible mistakes (even unrelated to unaware-
ness) are allowed. The other possibility is intro-
ducing multiple knowledge modalities, as de-
scribed above.
A few clarifications are in order. First, since
there are many knowledge modalities, which
is the one that provides the true description of
the agent’s knowledge? This depends on the
agent’s sub-language, which is determined by
his awareness. Consequently, when agent i rea-
sons about j’s knowledge, he first has to reason
about j’s awareness and sub-language.
2In the example, i’s sub-language is generated by primitive
propositions in α′ and j’s sub-language is generated by α.
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Second, more complete sub-languages give a
better description of one’s knowledge. The rea-
son is that more complete sub-languages con-
tain more knowledge modalities, kiαφ, k
i
α′φ,
kiα′′φ, describing i’s knowledge about formula
φ. Having multiple knowledge operators allows
for the possibility that although a state speci-
fies that an agent knows an event, the projec-
tion of that state to a less complete state space
specifies that he does not know it. This is be-
cause the projection contains fewer knowledge
operators and hence provides a less complete
description of one’s knowledge. Hence, knowl-
edge can change across projections not because
formulas in the projected states are allowed to
differ, but because some formulas describing
knowledge are not included in the projection.
We elaborate on this point when we construct
the canonical unawareness structure.
Third, we do not allow for false certainties. In
other words, it is never the case that an agent
knows a formula which is false. This is due to
the truth axiom. At the same time, we allow
agents to make statements which, from another
agent’s point of view with a richer awareness,
are mistaken. We say that agent i makes a mis-
take in his reasoning about j if, for example, he
is aware only of primitive propositions in α and
knows that j is aware of α, he knows that ¬kjαφ
and yet it is true that kjα′φ and agent j is aware
of all propositions in α′, where α ⊂ α′. Be-
cause ¬kjαφ is also true, the truth axiom is not
violated. Moreover, i is not making a mistake
when reasoning that j’s awareness is α, when
in fact it is α′. The reason is that i is only aware
of primitive propositions in α, so he cannot rea-
son above that level.
Comparing the present axiom system with
that of HMS, we find two main differences.
First, whereas in HMS knowledge in one sub-
language is equivalent to knowledge in any
other sub-language, here it only implies knowl-
edge in more complete sub-languages.3 Sec-
3The syntax of the two papers is not same. However, we
are able to map the syntax of HMS to the syntax of the present
ond, because in the present paper knowledge
differs across sub-languages, the knowledge
modalities “carry” awareness. For example, be-
ing aware of formula kiαφ implies awareness of
all propositions in α and is not equivalent to
being aware of kiβφ. This is not true in HMS,
because there is only one knowledge modality.
Hence, adapted to the syntax of the present pa-
per, the axiom system of HMS specifies that
awareness of kiαφ only implies awareness of all
primitive propositions that generate φ, and it is
equivalent to awareness of kiβφ. This second
difference implies, as we show in the following
section, that the axiom system of HMS is nei-
ther weaker nor stronger than the axiom system
of this paper.
Fagin and Halpern [1988] provide the first
model of unawareness and introduce an ex-
plicit awareness operator, as is the case with the
present paper. Modica and Rustichini [1994,
1999], Dekel et al. [1998] and HMS define
awareness in terms of knowledge. Both HMS
and Halpern and Reˆgo [2008] provide sound
and complete axiomatizations of Heifetz et al.
[2006], hence they are equivalent. Moreover,
they are multi agent generalizations of Mod-
ica and Rustichini [1999] and Halpern [2001],
respectively, which are also equivalent. HMS
is also equivalent to a multi agent version of a
sub-class of unawareness structures described
in Fagin and Halpern [1988].4 Board and
Chung [2007] provide a model of unawareness
using first order modal logic.
Heifetz et al. [2006], Li [2008] and Galanis
[2007] construct set-theoretic models of un-
awareness using multiple state spaces. On the
other hand, Geanakoplos [1989], Ely and Luo
[1998] and Xiong [2007] employ the standard
framework of a unique state space. Dekel et al.
[1998] argue that if unawareness satisfies three
plausible properties, then a standard state space
can only accommodate trivial unawareness.
paper in a natural way, so that the comparison of the axioms is
meaningful.
4For more details on the relationships between these papers,
see HMS and Halpern and Reˆgo [2008].
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Games with unawareness are analyzed by Fein-
berg [2004, 2005], Cˇopicˇ and Galeotti [2007],
Li [2006b], Sadzik [2006], Heifetz et al.
[2007], Heifetz et al. [2008b] and Halpern
and Reˆgo [2006]. Applications with unaware-
ness have been provided by Modica et al.
[1998], Ewerhart [2001], Galanis [2011], Filiz-
Ozbay [2008], Ozbay [2008], Thadden and
Zhao [2008] and Zhao [2008].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the syntax and the axiom system and
compares it to that of HMS. In section 3 we de-
fine the unawareness structures and in section
4 we construct the canonical structure. Sound-
ness and completeness are demonstrated in sec-
tion 5.
2 Syntax and axiom system
Let X be the set of primitive propositions, and
let I be the set of individuals. The syntax we
use involves the usual modalities ¬, ∧ and the
unusual modalities kiα and a
i
α, where α ⊆ X .
That is, instead of the “objective” knowledge
and awareness modalities ki and ai, we intro-
duce one for each subset α of the set of primi-
tive propositions.
Given a sequence of primitive propositions and
modalities, φ, let Pr(φ) be the set of primitive
propositions contained in φ.5 More precisely,
• Pr(>) = ∅,
• Pr(x) = {x}, for x ∈ X ,
• Pr(¬φ) = Pr(φ),
• Pr(φ ∧ ψ) = Pr(φ) ∪ Pr(ψ),
• Pr(kiαφ) = Pr(φ) ∪ α,
• Pr(aiαφ) = Pr(φ) ∪ α.
5The definition of Pr suggests that modalities like kiα and
aiα are also considered “primitive propositions”. For example,
we can have Pr(kiαφ) = α ) Pr(φ). HMS also define a Pr
function, but their definition is different. We elaborate on the
differences in the next section.
The set of formulas L is the smallest set such
that:
• > is a formula,
• every x ∈ X is a formula,
• if φ is a formula, then ¬φ is a formula,
• if φ and ψ are formulas, then φ ∧ ψ is a
formula,
• if φ is a formula and Pr(φ) ⊆ α ⊆ X ,
then aiαφ and k
i
αφ are formulas.
CallL the “universal” language. Given a subset
α ∈ X , define the sub-language Lα := {φ ∈
L : Pr(φ) ⊆ α}, which consists of the formu-
las and the knowledge and awareness modal-
ities containing only primitive propositions in
α.
Consider the following axiom system.
• All substitution instances of valid formu-
las of Propositional Calculus including the
formula >, (PC),
• the inference rule Modus Ponens:
φ, φ→ ψ
ψ
, (MP)
For Pr(φ), P r(ψ) ⊆ β ⊆ α ⊆ X ,
• the Axiom of Truth:
kiαφ→ φ, (T)
• the Axiom of Positive Introspection:
kiαφ ∧
x∈β
aiαx ∧
y∈α\β
¬aiαy → kiαkiβφ, (4)
• the Axiom of Negative Introspection :
aiαφ ∧
x∈β
aiαx→ kiαφ ∨ kiα(¬kiβφ ∧ aiβφ),
(5)
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• the Propositional Awareness axioms:
1. aiαφ↔ aiα¬φ,
2. aiαφ ∧ aiαψ ↔ aiα(φ ∧ ψ),
3. aiαk
j
βφ↔ ∧
x∈β
aiαx, for j ∈ I,
4. aiαa
j
βφ↔ ∧
x∈β
aiαx, for j ∈ I.
(PA)
• the inference rule RK-Inference: For all
natural numbers n ≥ 1 : If φ1, φ2, . . . , φn
and φ are formulas such that Pr(φ) ⊆
Uni=1Pr(φi) ⊆ α ⊆ X then
φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn → φ
kiαφ1 ∧ . . . ∧ kiαφn → kiαφ
. (RK)
• For Pr(φ) ⊆ α ⊆ α′ ⊆ X ,
kiαφ→ aiαφ, (A)
aiαφ↔ aiα′φ, (AA)
kiαφ→ kiα′φ. (KA)
Axioms PC and MP are standard and need no
explanation. Axioms T,4 and 5 are adapted ver-
sions of the familiar axioms kiφ → φ, kiφ →
kikiφ and kiφ∨ki¬kiφ, respectively. The main
difference is that these axioms are expressed in
a syntax with more than one knowledge modal-
ity.
In particular, axiom 4 says that if, within the
sub-language generated by primitive proposi-
tions in α, the agent knows φ and is aware
of propositions in β, then he knows that, in
the sub-language generated by β, he knows φ.
Note that the sub-language generated by α can-
not express awareness of a primitive proposi-
tion outside α. Axiom 5 specifies that being
aware of φ and all primitive propositions in β
implies that either he knows φ, or that he knows
that, within the sub-language generated by β,
he does not know φ and he is aware of it.
Axioms PA1 and PA2 are used in Modica and
Rustichini [1999] and in HMS but here they
are extended for all awareness modalities of all
sub-languages. Axiom PA3 specifies that agent
i is aware that, within the sub-language gener-
ated by β, agent j knows φ, if and only if i is
aware of all primitive propositions in β. This
axiom is similar to the PA3 axiom of HMS:
aiφ ↔ aikjφ, for j ∈ I . However, as we dis-
cuss in the following section, neither is weaker
or stronger than the other. Axiom PA4 has sim-
ilar intuition.6 RK-Inference is similar to the
RK-Inference rule introduced by HMS. There
are two differences. First, the Pr function here
is different from the Pr function in HMS. We
elaborate on this difference in the following
section. Second, the rule here applies to all per-
mitted knowledge modalities. Axiom A speci-
fies that knowledge implies awareness.
The last two axioms specify when awareness
and knowledge in one sub-language translate
to awareness and knowledge to another sub-
language. Axiom AA says that awareness of a
formula φ in a sub-language generated by α im-
plies awareness of φ in all sub-languages which
are either more or less complete and can ex-
press φ. Axiom KA specifies that knowledge
of φ in a sub-language generated by α implies
knowledge of φ only in sub-languages which
are more complete. This last axiom essentially
relaxes the condition that there is one, objec-
tive, knowledge modality, that transcends all
sub-languages, as in HMS and other papers in
the literature.
2.1 Relation to the axiom system of HMS
In this section we compare the present axiom
system with that of HMS. The main difficulty
is that the syntax of the two approaches is
different. In particular, whereas HMS have
one knowledge modality ki and one aware-
ness modality ai, the syntax of the present pa-
per contains several knowledge and awareness
modalities, kiα, a
i
α, one for each subset α ⊆ X
6HMS do not have a PA4 axiom, as they define awareness
as aiφ := kiφ ∨ ki¬kiφ, whereas here the only connection
between the awareness and knowledge modalities is through
the axioms.
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of primitive propositions.
We can only have a meaningful comparison if
the syntax is the same. This can be achieved
if we interpret ki, ai in the HMS syntax as the
modalities kiX , a
i
X , respectively, in the syntax
of this paper, where X is the set of all primi-
tive propositions. Moreover, we add to the ax-
iom system of HMS two axioms specifying that
all knowledge and awareness modalities are the
“same”. That is, if Pr(φ) ⊆ α ⊆ α′ ⊆ X ,
we have kiαφ ↔ kiα′φ and aiαφ ↔ aiα′φ. HMS
define the awareness modality as aiφ := kiφ ∨
ki¬kiφ. We incorporate this definition as an
axiom in their axiom system.
Finally, the definition of the function Pr in
HMS is different from the definition here.
Adapted to the syntax of the present paper,
Pr in HMS requires that Pr(kαφ) = Pr(φ),
whereas here it requires that Pr(kαφ) =
Pr(φ)∪α. This difference matters for the defi-
nition of RK-Inference. To distinguish between
the two, we denote as Pr′ the function Pr of
HMS.
Summarizing, the HMS axiom system, adapted
to the syntax of the present paper and with the
addition of the aforementioned axioms, takes
the following form. We denote similar axioms
with a ′.
• Axioms (PC), (MP),
• the Axiom of Truth:
kiXφ→ φ, (T′)
• the Axiom of Positive Introspection:
kiXφ→ kiXkiXφ, , (4′)
• the Propositional Awareness axioms:
1. aiXφ↔ aiX¬φ,
2. aiXφ ∧ aiXψ ↔ aiX(φ ∧ ψ),
3. aiXφ↔ aiXkjXφ, for j ∈ I.
(PA′)
• the inference rule RK-Inference: For all
natural numbers n ≥ 1 : If φ1, φ2, . . . , φn
and φ are formulas such that Pr′(φ) ⊆
Uni=1Pr
′(φi) then
φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn → φ
kiXφ1 ∧ . . . ∧ kiXφn → kiXφ
. ( RK′)
For Pr(φ) ⊆ α ⊆ α′ ⊆ X ,7
aiαφ↔ aiα′φ, (AA)
kiαφ↔ kiα′φ, (KA′)
aiXφ↔ kiXφ ∨ kiX¬kiXφ. (D)
The first difference between the two axiom
systems is that KA′ is relaxed to KA. That
is, whereas in HMS there is effectively only
one knowledge operator that transcends all sub-
languages, in the present axiom system knowl-
edge in one sub-language only implies knowl-
edge in more complete sub-languages.
The second difference is that in the HMS sys-
tem knowledge and awareness modalities kiα
and aiα do not “carry” any awareness. It is a
theorem of the HMS system that being aware
of the formula kiαφ is equivalent to being aware
of formula kiα′φ, for any α
′ ⊆ X .8 This is con-
sistent with the premise that there is effectively
only one knowledge modality, ki. In contrast,
in the approach of the present paper knowl-
edge operators “carry” awareness, so that being
aware of formula kiαφ does not imply awareness
of kiα′φ. The difference between the two ap-
proaches is illustrated by axioms PA3 and PA′3.
Although they look similar, it is not the case
that one is weaker than the other.
In particular, PA′3 is not a theorem of the cur-
rent axiom system. To see this, note that if this
were the case, then aiXφ → aiXkjXφ and PA3
7Note that we use the Pr function, not the Pr′ one, be-
cause we want the two axioms to hold for all knowledge and
awareness modalities that can express formula φ.
8This is derived from the Propositional Awareness axioms,
lemma 1 in HMS, and the definition of Pr′.
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would imply that whenever i is aware of a for-
mula φ, he is also aware of all primitive propo-
sitions inX . For the same reason, PA3 and PA4
are not theorems of the HMS axiom system.9
As a result, it is not the case that the present
axiom system is either weaker or stronger than
the HMS axiom system.
The following proposition shows that the re-
maining axioms are theorems of the HMS sys-
tem. Let inference rule RK′′ be the same as
RK but adding the qualification that Pr′(φ) ⊆
Uni=1Pr
′(φi).
Proposition 1. Axioms PC, T, 4, 5, PA1, PA2,
A, AA, KA and inference rules MP and RK′′ are
derived from the axiom system of HMS.
3 Unawareness structures
We first present an overview of the model de-
veloped in Galanis [2007]. Consider a com-
plete lattice of disjoint state spaces S =
{Sa}a∈A and denote by Σ = ∪a∈ASa the union
of these state spaces. A state ω is an element of
some state space S. Let S∗ be the most com-
plete state space, the join of all state spaces in
S.
Let  be a partial order on S . For any S,
S ′ ∈ S, S  S ′ means that S ′ is more ex-
pressive than S. Moreover, there is a surjec-
tive projection rS′S : S
′ → S. Projections are
required to commute. If S  S ′  S ′′ then
rS
′′
S = r
S′
S ◦ rS′′S′ . If ω ∈ S ′, denote ωS = rS′S (ω)
and ωS′′ = {ω1 ∈ S ′′ : rS′′S′ (ω1) = ω}. If
B ⊆ S ′, let BS = {ωS : ω ∈ B} be the re-
striction of event B to a less expressive state
space S and let BS′′ =
⋃{ωS′′ : ω ∈ B} be its
enlargement to a more expressive state space
S ′′. Let g(S) = {S ′ : S  S ′} be the col-
lection of state spaces that are at least as ex-
pressive as S. For a set B ⊆ S, denote by
B↑ =
⋃
S′∈g(S)(r
S′
S )
−1(B) the enlargements of
9Another difference is between inference rules RK and RK′,
because Pr is not equivalent to Pr′. Pr specifies that kiα, aiα
carry awareness, so that Pr(kiαφ) = Pr(φ) ∪ α, whereas Pr′
specifies that they do not, so that Pr(kiαφ) = Pr(φ).
B to all state spaces which are at least as ex-
pressive as S.
Consider a possibility correspondence P i :
Σ→ 2Σ with the following properties:
(0) Confinedness: If ω ∈ S then P i(ω) ⊆ S ′
for some S ′  S.
(1) Generalized Reflexivity: ω ∈ (P i(ω))↑ for
every ω ∈ Σ.
(2) Stationarity: ω′ ∈ P i(ω) implies P i(ω′) =
P i(ω).
(3) Projections Preserve Awareness: If ω ∈
S ′, ω ∈ P i(ω) and S  S ′ then ωS ∈
P i(ωS).
(4) Projections Preserve Ignorance: If ω ∈ S ′
and S  S ′ then (P i(ω))↑ ⊆ (P i(ωS))↑.
The setting is the same with that of Heifetz et al.
[2006]. The first difference is that we com-
pletely take out their axiom Projections Pre-
serve Knowledge: If S  S ′  S ′′, ω ∈ S ′′ and
P i(ω) ⊆ S ′ then (P i(ω))S = P i(ωS). Justifi-
cation and examples for this omission are pro-
vided in Galanis [2007]. The two other differ-
ences concern the definitions of an event and
those of knowledge and awareness.
3.1 Events, awareness and knowledge
An event E is a subset of some (necessarily
unique) state space S ∈ S . The negation of
E, denoted by ¬E, is the complement of E
with respect to S. Denote the complement of
S by ∅S . Let E = {E ⊆ S : S ∈ S} be
the collection of all events. For each event E,
let S(E) be the state space of which it is a sub-
set. An eventE “inherits” the expressiveness of
the state space of which it is a subset. Hence,
we can extend  to a partial order 0 on E
in the following way: E 0 E ′ if and only if
S(E)  S(E ′). Abusing notation, we write 
instead of 0.7
Before defining knowledge, we need to define
awareness. For any event E, for any state space
S such that E  S, define
AiS(E) = {ω ∈ S : E  P i(ω)}
to be the event which describes, with the vocab-
ulary of S, that the agent is aware of event E.
The condition E  S imposes that only a state
space rich enough to describe E, can also de-
scribe the agent’s awareness of E. The agent is
aware of an event if his possibility resides in a
state space that is rich enough to express event
E. Unawareness is defined as the negation of
awareness. More formally, the event U iS(E) de-
scribes, with the vocabulary of S, that the agent
is unaware of E:
U iS(E) = ¬AiS(E).
Let Ωi : Σ → S be such that for any ω ∈ Σ,
Ωi(ω) = S if and only if P i(ω) ⊆ S. Ωi(ω)
denotes the agent’s state space at ω. An agent
knows an event E if he is aware of it and in all
the states he considers possible, E is true. For-
mally, for any event E and for any state space
S such that E  S, define
KiS(E) = {ω ∈ AiS(E) : P i(ω) ⊆ EΩi(ω)}.
An unawareness structure is defined to be, as in
HMS, the tuple
Σ =
〈
(Sα)α∈A ,
(
rSαSβ
)
SβSα
,
(
P i
)
i∈I
〉
.
4 The canonical structure
Recall that, given a subset α ∈ X , Lα = {φ ∈
L : Pr(φ) ⊆ α} is the sub-language gen-
erated by the set α of primitive propositions.
Given α ⊆ X , define Ωα to be the set of max-
imally consistent sets ωα of formulas in Lα.
Let Ω = ∪α⊆XΩα be the collection of all state
spaces and define Ωβ  Ωα whenever β ⊆ α.
If Ωβ  Ωα then the projection rαβ : Ωα → Ωβ
is defined as rαβ (ω) := ω ∩ Lβ . From proposi-
tion 3 and remark 2 of HMS, the projection rαβ
is well defined and surjective, and α ⊇ β ⊇ γ
implies rαγ = r
β
γ ◦ rαβ .
Given a formula φ and a subset α ⊇ Pr(φ),
[φ]Ωα := {ω ∈ Ωα : φ ∈ ω} is an event, as it is
a subset of state space Ωα.
Definition 1. For ω ∈ Ωα, α ⊆ X and i ∈ I ,
set
P i(ω) :=
{
ω′ ∈ Ω : For every formula φ
i) kiαφ ∈ ω implies φ ∈ ω′
ii) aiαφ ∈ ω iff (φ ∈ ω′ or ¬φ ∈ ω′)
}
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Proposition 2. For every i ∈ I and ω ∈ Σ,
P i(ω) is nonempty and satisfies properties 0-4.
Corollary 1. The tuple
Ω =
〈
(Ωα)α⊆X ,
(
rαβ
)
β⊆α⊆X ,
(
P i
)
i∈I
〉
,
is an unawareness structure.
Moreover, as the following lemma shows,
knowledge and awareness can interchangeably
be described syntactically or as an event.
Lemma 1. Suppose that φ ∈ L and Pr(φ) ⊆
β ⊆ α ⊆ X . Then,
[¬φ]Ωα = ¬[φ]Ωα ,
[φ ∧ ψ]Ωα = [φ]Ωα ∩ [ψ]Ωα ,
[kiβφ]Ωα =
(
KiΩβ([φ]ΩPr(φ))
)
Ωα
,
[aiβφ]Ωα =
(
AiΩβ([φ]ΩPr(φ))
)
Ωα
.
Given a formula φ, a state ω ∈ Ωα contains a
sequence of knowledge modalities kiα′φ, where
α′ is such that Pr(φ) ⊆ α′ ⊆ α. Which one of
the knowledge modalities is the “true” descrip-
tion of i’s knowledge of φ? This depends on i’s
awareness. If ω specifies that i is aware only of
primitive propositions in α′ ⊆ α, then his sub-
language is Ωα′ and he knows φ if kiα′φ ∈ ω.
It is important to stress that Ωα, as a description
of i’s knowledge, can be quite restrictive. The
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reason is that agent i may be aware of a primi-
tive proposition x which does not belong to α.
As a result, sub-language Ωα is not complete
enough to express awareness of x. But more
importantly, in that case Ωα is also not complete
enough to express i’s knowledge of φ as well.
In particular, if α′′ = α∪{x} then the modality
kiα′′φ is better suited to describe i’s knowledge.
But it does not belong to the sub-language Lα,
so it is not part of any state in Ωα.
According to the axiom system, a less complete
sub-language can only underestimate one’s
knowledge, not overestimate it. In particular,
suppose that kiαφ ∈ ω and ∧
x∈α
aiαx ∈ ω so that
i knows φ, according to ω. Because of axiom
KA, it must be that kiα′′φ ∈ ω′ for any ω′ ∈ Ωα′′
that projects to ω, where α ⊂ α′′. On the other
hand, if ¬kiαφ ∈ ω we may have kiα′′φ ∈ ω′
or ¬kiα′′φ ∈ ω′. Hence, more complete state
spaces give a better description of one’s knowl-
edge.
Summarizing, it may be that ω′ specifies that
agent i knows φ, whereas the projection of ω′
to a lower state space specifies that he does not
know φ. This is the Awareness Leads to Knowl-
edge property, proposed in Galanis [2007]. The
intuition behind this property is that the pro-
jection belongs to a state space which is gen-
erated by a less complete sub-language, hence
containing fewer knowledge modalities kiα′φ,
which may underestimate i’s knowledge. This
property is not true in HMS, effectively because
there is only one knowledge modality, ki.
5 Soundness and completeness
Recall that E = {E ⊆ S : S ∈ S} is the collec-
tion of all events and let E↑ := {E↑ : E ∈ E}
be the collection of extended events. A typical
element of E↑ consists of an event E ⊆ S and
all of its enlargements to higher state spaces
ES′ , where S  S ′. For a given set of prim-
itive propositions X , let v : X → E↑ be the
evaluation function. The extended event v(x)
contains all events where the primitive proposi-
tion x obtains. An unawareness model is a pair
Σv := (Σ, v). Abusing notation, we write Σ
for an unawareness model, instead of Σv. Let
C : S → 2X denote which primitive propo-
sitions in X occur in state space S. That is,
define, for each S ∈ S, C(S) := ⋃{x ∈ X :
E ∈ v(x), E ⊆ S}. We assume that if S 6= S ′
then C(S) 6= C(S ′). Given any set α ⊆ X ,
let C−1(α) :=
∧{S ∈ S : α ⊆ C(S)} be the
least complete state space where all primitive
propositions in α occur.
We first specify what it means for a formula φ
to be defined at a particular state ω.
Definition 2. For a nonempty setX and a set of
players I , let (Σ, v) be an unawareness model,
and let ω ∈ S for some S ∈ S. Then we define
by induction on the formation of the formulas
in L:
• (Σ, ω) 7→ >, for all ω ∈ Σ,
• (Σ, ω) 7→ x, if ω ∈ E ∈ E↑ = v(x),
• (Σ, ω) 7→ φ ∧ ψ, if (Σ, ω) 7→ φ and
(Σ, ω) 7→ ψ,
• (Σ, ω) 7→ ¬φ, if (Σ, ω) 7→ φ,
• (Σ, ω) 7→ aiαφ, if Pr(φ) ⊆ α = C(S ′),
S ′  S, and (Σ, ω) 7→ φ,
• (Σ, ω) 7→ kiαφ, if Pr(φ) ⊆ α = C(S ′),
S ′  S, and (Σ, ω) 7→ φ.
Definition 3. Say that a formula φ is defined at
state ω ∈ S ∈ S of unawareness model Σ if
(Σ, ω) 7→ φ.
Note that kiαφ, a
i
αφ are defined at state ω ∈ S
only if the set of primitive propositions α cor-
responds to a state space S ′ (C(S ′) = α) that is
less complete than S. In that way, we get a one
to one correspondence between the knowledge
(awareness) modality kiα (a
i
α) and the knowl-
edge (awareness) operator KiC−1(α) (A
i
C−1(α)).
As the following definition shows, the negation
of a formula is true if it is defined but not true.
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Definition 4. For a nonempty setX and a set of
players I , let (Σ, v) be an unawareness model,
and let ω ∈ S for some S ∈ S. Then we define
by induction on the formation of the formulas
in L:
• (Σ, ω) |= >, for all ω ∈ Σ,
• (Σ, ω) |= x, if ω ∈ E ∈ E↑ = v(x),
• (Σ, ω) |= φ ∧ ψ, if (Σ, ω) |= φ and
(Σ, ω) |= ψ,
• (Σ, ω) |= ¬φ, if (Σ, ω) 7→ ¬φ and not
(Σ, ω) |= φ ,
• (Σ, ω) |= aiαφ, if (Σ, ω) 7→ aiαφ and
{ω}C−1(α) ∈ AiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))),
• (Σ, ω) |= kiαφ, if (Σ, ω) 7→ kiαφ and
{ω}C−1(α) ∈ KiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))),
where, given a formula ψ and S ∈ S such that
(Σ, ω) 7→ ψ for some ω ∈ S, [ψ]S := {ω ∈ S :
(Σ, ω) |= ψ}. Moreover, ¬[ψ]S is the comple-
ment with respect to S.
Theorem 1. The system of axioms is strongly
sound and complete with respect to the class of
unawareness models.
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